

Message Text

PAGE 01 MADRID 06472 01 OF 03 062229Z

67

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

----- 049282

R 061712Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7164

INFO USNMR SHAPE - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GOODPASTER

USCINCEUR - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN EADE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MADRID 6472

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MARR SP XF

SUBJECT: SPANISH ACTIONS RE: USE OF BASES IN MIDEAST CONFLICT

REF: (A) MADRID 5855; (B) MADRID 5752; (C) MADRID 5944;
(D) MADRID 5933; (E) MADRID 5951; (F) MADRID 6004;
(G) MADRID 6076; (H) MADRID 6077; (I) MADRID 6075;
(J) MADRID 6080; (K) MADRID 6074; (L) MADRID 6010

1. FOLLOWING IS A RECAPITULATION OF RECENT SPANISH ACTIONS RELATING TO THE MIDEAST CONFLICT (PARAS 2-6) AND, IN PARAS 7-8, SOME THOUGHTS WHICH MAY BE USEFUL IN FORMULATING OUR POSITIONS IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH SPANISH ON DEFENSE COOPERATION.

2. THE GOS HAS BEEN SEEKING ANXIOUSLY TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL STRUGGLE. THE ONLY OFFICIAL STATEMENT IT HAS ISSUED ON THE CONFLICT PER SE WAS THE ONE ON OCTOBER 11, RELEASED AFTER A CABINET MEETING, WHICH SIMPLY REPEATED SENTIMENTS OF TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP TOWARD THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND OFFERED A PRAYER FOR A PROMPT, JUST AND STABLE PEACE (REF A). IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERIES AND ARAB PRESSURES, THE GOS ISSUED TWO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING USE OF THE SPANISH BASES
SECRET

PAGE 02 MADRID 06472 01 OF 03 062229Z

IN RELATION TO THE MIDEAST CONFLICT. ONE, ON OCTOBER 9, ASSERTED THAT US FORCES WERE NOT ENTITLED TO USE SPANISH BASES IN A LOCAL CONFLICT SUCH AS THAT BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAEL (REF B); THE OTHER, ON OCTOBER 11, ASSERTED THAT

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN SPAIN HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT BE USED FOR ACTIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RELATED TO THIS CONFLICT (REF C). IN ADDITION, THE INFORMATION MINISTER STATED, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION DURING HIS BRIEFING ON A CABINET MEETING ON OCTOBER 26, THAT SPANISH BASES HAD NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE US ALERT OF ITS MILITARY FORCES.

3. THE SPANISH POSITION OPPOSING USE OF BASES IN SPAIN IN SUPPORT OF MIDEAST OPERATIONS WAS FLATLY AFFIRMED BY FOREIGN MINISTER LOPEZ-RODO IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON OCTOBER 16, CALLED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER (REF D). THE MINISTER WENT ON TO REQUEST URGENT CONVOCAION OF A SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING TO OBTAIN ASSURANCES THAT SPANISH BASES WOULD NOT BE USED IN THE MIDEAST CONFLICT. HE ALSO REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING AN ALLEGEDLY ABNORMAL NUMBER OF US TANKER AIRCRAFT AT TORREJON AND ASKED FOR TRANSFER OF THE TANKERS FROM TORREJON TO ZARAGOZA BECAUSE OF THE DANGER TO POPULATED AREAS. FURTHERMORE, HE ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE SIGHTING OF TWO F-4S AT TORREJON PAINTED DIFFERENTLY FROM CUSTOMARY USAF COLORS. ON OCTOBER 17, THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED IN A LETTER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE NUMBER OF KC-135 TANKERS AT TORREJON WAS NOT ABNORMAL, THAT THIS AIRCRAFT HAD AN EXCELLENT SAFETY RECORD AND DID NOT FLY OVER POPULATED AREAS, AND THAT THE TWO F-4 AIRCRAFT OBSERVED AT TORREJON WITH DISTINCT MARKINGS WERE PART OF A SHIPMENT DELIVERED TO IRAN WITH NORMAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND CLEARANCES BY SPANISH AND US MILITARY AUTHORITIES (REF E).

4. AT A MEETING ON OCTOBER 18, REQUESTED BY THE AMBASSADOR, THE FOREIGN MINISTER REACTED PASSIVELY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION OF THE US POSITION EMPHASIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDEAST AND THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF SPAIN AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES (REF F). THE MINISTER SAID THAT HE WOULD READ THE US STATEMENT CAREFULLY AND ADDED HE STILL EXPECTED AN URGENT SPECIAL SECRET

PAGE 03 MADRID 06472 01 OF 03 062229Z

MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE BUT HE INDICATED THAT ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WOULD BE TO TALK ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE US TANKER WING AT TORREJON. HOWEVERAN AT THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING ON OCTOBER 19, HELD FOLLOWING A CABINET MEETING THAT DAY, LOPEZ-RODO WENT TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTH TO EXPLAIN THE STRONG SPANISH POSITION OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDEAST CONFLICT (REF G), AFTER WHICH HE PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS THE SPANISH REQUEST FOR TRANSFER OF THE US TANKER WING FROM TORREJON (REF H).

5. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE THRUST OF THE SPANISH APPROACH DURING THESE MEETINGS WAS TO AFFIRM THEIR POSITION OPPOSED TO US USE OF BASES IN SPAIN FOR MIDEAST OPERATIONS,

AS DISTINCT FROM ACCUSING THE US OF SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS. DURING THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING, THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED A GENERALIZED OBJECTION TO ALLEGED US AIRLIFT FLIGHTS OVER SPAIN, CLAIMING THAT OVERFLIGHTS TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL WERE NOT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE AFC. THE AMBASSADOR'S LETTER TO HIM THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, CONFIRMED THAT THE PATHS OF US RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT REMAINED OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND DID NOT PENETRATE SPANISH AIRSPACE (REF I). THE FOREIGN MINISTER, IN TURN, REPLIED WITH A LETTER NOTING THAT SINCE SPANISH TERRITORIAL WATERS WERE 6 MILES IN WIDTH AND THOSE OF MOROCCO 12, WHILE THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR WAS 7-1/2 MILES WIDE AT ITS NARROWEST PART, THE RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT HAD TO OVERFLY EITHER SPANISH OR MOROCCAN TERRITORY. IN LIGHT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT THAT THE PLANES DID NOT PENETRATE SPANISH AIRSPACE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONTINUED, EVIDENTLY WITH TONGUE-IN-CHEEK, HE WOULD WISH TO CONVEY THIS TO THE MOROCCAN AUTHORITIES IF THEY ASKED ABOUT IT (REF J). WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE OF US TANKER REFUELING OPERATIONS OUT OF TORREJON, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY RADAR FOLLOWED TANKERS TO FUELING RENDEZVOUS, THE SPANISH HAVE NOT MADE ANY REFERENCE TO ACTUAL FLIGHTS, THOUGH LOPEZ-RODO MADE CLEAR AT THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING THE SPANISH VIEW THAT THERE IS NO AUTHORITY IN THE AGREEMENTS FOR USE OF THE BASES TO SUPPORT ANY BELLIGERENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL STRUGGLE NOT EVEN BY TANKERS TO REFUEL AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE TO THE WAR ZONE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 MADRID 06472 02 OF 03 062237Z

67

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

----- 049304

R 061712Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7165

INFO USNMR SHAPE - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GOODPASTER

USCINCEUR - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ADE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MADRID 6472

EXDIS

6. ALSO NOTEWORTHY WAS THE EMPHASIS AND URGENCY ATTACHED BY THE SPANISH TO THE ISSUE OF TRANSFERRING THE US TANKER WING FROM TORREJON TO ANOTHER SPANISH BASE CONCURRENTLY WITH THE DISCUSSIONS ON USE OF THE BASES IN THE MIDEAST

CONFLICT. THE QUESTION OF REMOVING MILITARY FACILITIES FROM TORREJON, WHICH IS SO CLOSE TO MADRID, IS A LONG-STANDING ONE. SINCE THE REASONS CITED BY THE SPANISH, AT THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING, FOR REMOVAL OF THE TANKER AIRCRAFT FROM TORREJON (DANGER TO POPULATED AREAS AND INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC) EVEN IF THEY WERE VALID, ARE NOT BASED ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THUS DID NOT JUSTIFY URGENT CONSIDERATION AT A SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING, THE REAL MOTIVES FOR RAISING THE ISSUE AT THIS MEETING WERE OBVIOUSLY UNSTATED.

7. FROM THESE OBSERVATIONS AND OTHER INDICATIONS, WE CAN DRAW THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

(A) PRESSED BY THE ARABS, ANXIOUS TO PROTECT SPANISH INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND AVERT INCREASED DANGERS THAT WOULD ENSUE FROM HOSTILITY OF NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES ON SPAIN'S SOUTHERN FLANK, CONCERNED ABOUT SPAIN'S OIL SUPPLY, SENSITIVE TO POSSIBLE PUBLIC CRITICISM THAT THE DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH THE US COULD DRAW THE SPANISH INTO A SECRET

PAGE 02 MADRID 06472 02 OF 03 062237Z

CONFLICT AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND HARASSED BY PRESS QUERIES AND RUMORS CONCERNING USE OF THE BASES IN THE MIDEAST CONFLICT, THE GOS HAS ACTED WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING CLEARLY ITS POSITION OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDEAST CONFLICT AND DISASSOCIATING ITSELF FROM ANY US OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL.

(B) AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOS HAS SOUGHT TO AVOID A HEAD-ON CONFRONTATION WITH THE US ON THE ACTUAL USE OF THE BASES AND HAS THUS REFRAINED FROM PURSUING CHARGES OF SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. IN THIS REGARD, LOPEZ-RODO HAS EVIDENTLY BEEN OPERATING UNDER EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS FROM FRANCO AND CARERO BLANCO. HE WAS THUS UNABLE TO REACT IMMEDIATELY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION OF THE US POSITION ON OCTOBER 18 BUT HAD TO AWAIT GUIDANCE FROM HIS SUPERIORS AT THE CABINET MEETING THE NEXT DAY BEFORE PRESSING THE SPANISH POSITION AT THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING HELD THAT AFTERNOON. HE MAY HAVE PRESENTED THE SPANISH POSITION MORE BLUNTLY AND RIGIDLY THAN WAS INTENDED BECAUSE OF HIS OWN STIFF, SEVERE OPERATING STYLE.

(C) BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE GOS HAS EVIDENTLY TRIED TO AVOID ACTIONS AND SPECULATION THAT MIGHT PROVOKE ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION WITH RESPECT TO US USE OF FACILITIES IN SPAIN. SINCE THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS OF OCTOBER 9 AND 11, WHICH THE GOS CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO RESPOND TO ARAB AND MEDIA PRESSURES, NO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT HAVE BEEN ISSUED OTHER THAN THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN'S RESPONSE TO A QUERY CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF THE US MILITARY ALERT ON SPANISH BASES.

REPORTEDLY, THE GOVERNMENT MADE IT KNOWN TO THE MEDIA THAT SPECULATION CONCERNING US USE OF THE SPANISH WAS TO BE AVOIDED. THE EUROPA PRESS REPORT ALLEGING FLIGHTS OF USAF TRANSPORTS AND FIGHTER-BOMBERS OVER ALMERIA BOUND FOR ISRAEL (REF K), WHICH WAS CITED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER DURING THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING, DID NOT APPEAR IN THE SPANISH PRESS.

(D) THE SPANISH AND US POSITIONS ON USE OF THE BASES HAVING ALREADY BEEN SET FORTH IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR, THE SPANISH DESIRED
SECRET

PAGE 03 MADRID 06472 02 OF 03 062237Z

A SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING NOT SIMPLY TO PURSUE THIS SUBJECT, THOUGH AFTER THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION OF THE US POSITION THEY MAY HAVE FELT IT NECESSARY TO REFUTE SOME OF THE US CONTENTIONS IN DEFENDING THEIR OWN POSITION. ANOTHER MAJOR MOTIVE FOR THE MEETING WAS TO ENABLE THE SPANISH TO TELL THEIR ARAB INTERLOCUTORS AND TO REPLY TO OTHER QUERIES AND DOMESTIC CRITICS THAT THE SPANISH POSITION OPPOSING USE OF THE BASES FOR MIDEAST OPERATIONS HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS IN THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH SUCH MATTERS. MOREOVER, THE SPANISH DESIRED TO PRESENT THEIR REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF THE TANKER WING ON AN URGENT BASIS YET WITH FULL FORMALITY.

SECRET

PAGE 01 MADRID 06472 03 OF 03 062253Z

67

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

----- 049369

R 061712Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7166

INFO USNMR SHAPE - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GOODPASTER

USCINCEUR - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN EADE

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MADRID 6472

EXDIS

(E) URGENTLY RAISING THE ISSUE OF REMOVAL OF THE TANKER WING FROM TORREJON ALONG WITH THE QUESTION OF TE USE OF SPANISH BASES IN THE MIDEAST CONFLICT WAS MORE

THAN COINCIDENTAL. THE SPANISH MADE NO DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES BUT IT WAS IMPLICIT. MORE REVEALING THAN THE ARGUMENTS USED BY THE SPANISH AT THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING WERE THE EXPLANATIONS OF UNDERLYING MOTIVES GIVEN BY THE AIR MINISTER, GENERAL SALVADOR, TO THE VICE COMMANDER OF THE 16TH AF (REF L). THE FIRST ARGUMENT USED BY SALVADOR WAS THAT THE HIGH VISIBILITY OF THE TANKERS AT TORREJON MAKE THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES MORE VULNERABLE TO POLITICAL PRESSURES, AND HE NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT UNUSUAL TANKER DEPARTURES WERE MORE LIKELY TO GO UNNOTICED FROM ZARAGOZA OR MORON THAN FROM TORREJON. ALSO UNMENTIONED AT THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING WAS SALVADOR'S REFERENCE TO THE ECONOMIES THE GOS WOULD GAIN FROM MOVING GETAFE AIR BASE OPERATIONS TO TORREJON. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SALVADOR, AS AIR MINISTER, HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS. UNDOUBTEDLY, IT IS HE WHO IS EXERTING THE GREATEST PRESSURE WITHIN THE GOS TO URGE THE US TO TRANSFER OPERATIONS FROM TORREJON. ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE SALVADOR IS SINCERELY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO US-SPANISH RELATIONS FROM PUBLIC REACTION TO A TAKE-OFF ACCIDENT AT

SECRET

PAGE 02 MADRID 06472 03 OF 03 062253Z

TORREJON, NO MATTER HOW REMOTE THIS CONTINGENCY APPEARS, HIS STAND ON TRANSFER OF TANKERS IS STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY HIS DESIRE TO SHIFT TO TORREJON SPANISH AIR OPERATIONS AT GETAFE AND TO AVOID FUTURE INTERFERENCE WITH EXPANDING CIVIL AIR OPERATIONS AT BARAJAS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOS PERCEIVES CONSIDERABLE INTERNAL POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO BE DERIVED FROM REMOVAL OF US MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM TORREJON. THE PROXIMITY OF US FACILITIES TO MADRID HAS BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR CONDITIONING ADVERSE PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BASE AGREEMENTS. EVEN PARTIAL REMOVAL OF US FACILITIES FROM TORREJON IN THE NEAR FUTURE COULD BE USED BY THE GOS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS FIRMNESS WITH THE US IN PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST, SHOW ITS RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION, AND ENHANCE ITS POPULAR STANDING.

(F) BY RAISING THE ISSUE OF REMOVAL OF THE TANKER WING TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTION OF USE OF THE BASES IN THE MIDEAST CRISIS, THE SPANISH MAY HAVE INTENDED TO CONVEY AN UNSTATED MESSAGE: NAMELY, THAT BY REFRAINING FROM PURSUING CHARGES OF US VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS, THE GOS WAS SHOWING UNDERSTANDING OF US ACTIONS IN THE MIDEAST CONFLICT WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PRESSURES FROM THE ARABS AND THE SPANISH PUBLIC; IN RETURN, THE GOS REQUESTED US UNDERSTANDING OF THE NECESSITY OF REMOVING MAJOR US FACILITIES FROM TORREJON TO A PLACE WHERE US USE OF THESE FACILITIES WOULD BE LESS VISIBLE, SO AS TO REDUCE PUBLIC PRESSURES ANTAGONISTIC TO EXISTING DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE US, WHILE FURTHERING SAFETY

AND ECONOMY, AND THUS IN THEIR VIEW SERVING THE INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW THAT THE QUESTION OF THE TANKER PRESENCE AT TORREJON WAS MORE PROPERLY ONE FOR CONSIDERATION DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON RENEWING THE BASE AGREEMENT, THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE QUESTION COULD NOT BE DELAYED THAT LONG.

8. AS EXPECTED, LOPEZ-RODO'S STYLE AND APPROACH IN PRESENTING GOS POSITION, ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE LEAST UNFRIENDLY, HAS BEEN MORE BLUNT AND DIRECT THAN WAS LOPEZ BRAVO'S, WHO, IN MY OPINION, WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SUBTLE IN HIS PRESENTATION. WE MUST EXPECT THE SAME APPROACH TO BE
SECRET

PAGE 03 MADRID 06472 03 OF 03 062253Z

TAKEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR RENEWAL OF THE 1970 AGREEMENT. THE ISSUE OF TORREJON (POSSIBLY INCLUDING REMOVAL OF ALL US FORCES FROM THERE) WILL PROBABLY BE ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL DEMANDS OF THE GOS DURING THAT PROCESS, AND FOR THAT REASON I BELIEVE WE SHOULD INSIST THAT THE REQUEST TO TRANSFER TANKERS SHOULD BE FOLDED INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR 1953 AGREEMENT THE SELECTION OF TORREJON WAS MADE AFTER MUCH DELIBERATION BY BOTH SPANISH AND US, THAT THE SPANISH WERE THE ONES WHO WERE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN HAVING THE BASE THERE, AND THAT THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH BARAJAS AND MADRID.

CONFIRMATION OF THE ABOVE AND A HISTORY OF BASE UTILIZATION DURING THESE 20 YEARS, ESPECIALLY ITS EFFECT ON THE SAFETY FACTOR, WOULD BE USEFUL IN COUNTERING THE GOS EMPHASIS ON URGENT SOLUTION OF ALLEGED SAFETY PROBLEMS.

9. AT REGULAR JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING ON OCTOBER 31, LOPEZ-RODO WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO REOPEN THE SUBJECT OF OUR CONVERSATION OF OCTOBER 18 (NOT ON AGENDA) AND TO STATE THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAS TOTAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLICY OBJECTIVE OF THE US GOVERNMENT THAT RUSSIA NOT SUCCESSFULLY IMPOSE THEIR WILL IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS SUPPORTS THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN PARA 7(F) ABOVE.
RIVERO

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic DecapTIONing: Z
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PEACE, ARMED FORCES, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY BASES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, MILITARY LOGISTICS, MILITARY MISSIONS, MILITARY PLANS, MILITARY POLICIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 NOV 1973
DecapTION Date: 28 MAY 2004
DecapTION Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973MADRID06472
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750023-0610
From: MADRID
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731166/abqcefwfwm.tel
Line Count: 369
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: (A) MADRID 5855; (B) MADRID 5752; (C) MADRID 5944; (D) MADRID 5933; (E) MADRID 5951; (F) MADRID 6004; (G) MADRID 6076; (H) MADRID 6077; (I) MADRID 6075; (J) MADRID 6080; (K) MADRID 6074; (L) MADRID 6010
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 OCT 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01-Oct-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <30-Nov-2001 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SPANISH ACTIONS RE: USE OF BASES IN MIDEAST CONFLICT
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, SP, XF, IS, US
To: STATE INFO USNMR SHAPE - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GOODPASTER
USCINCEUR - EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN EADE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005